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Highlights
• In the context of the current revamping of the Regulation 994/2010 on the security 
of gas supply, this brief note from the Florence School of Regulation investigates 
ways to strengthen the existing EU regulatory framework for long-term import 
contracts (herea er “LTCs”) with extra-EU gas suppliers.  e focus is exclusively 
on commercial contracts. 
•  e impact of LTCs on security of gas supply and competition is markedly di erent 
in hub-based Western markets and isolated Eastern markets.
•  e existing EU regulatory framework follows a ‘reactive’ approach, pursuing 
two objectives: reacting to emergency situations or supply disruptions and tack-
ling market abuse. It operates through three complementary but partly overlap-
ping mechanisms: an ex-ante transparency mechanism structured by the Gas SoS 
Regulation, ex-post competition enforcement by the European Commission and a 
hybrid ex-post mechanism combining transparency and enforcement by national 
regulators through REMIT.
• EU competition law and REMIT work ex-post and mainly rely on hoped-for deter-
rence e ects.  ey are not underpinned by a security of supply rationale and are 
unable to address the concerns of the most vulnerable Member States as regards 
the security of their gas supply.  e Gas SoS transparency mechanism is a forward-
looking instrument, but it only reaches its full e ect in the so-called alert and emer-
gency stages. It is also fundamentally limited by severe design  aws.
• In this context, it is possible to consider the introduction of a new mechanism 
allowing for regulatory control ex-ante, i.e. before LTCs are signed. If we were to 
follow that route, we would advocate the creation of a mechanism mirroring the 
one already established for merchant transmission investments, with the possible 
involvement of ACER or the Commission. In this case, noti cation of LTCs to the 
national regulator should be conditioned by a market share threshold.
• Transparency is paramount to enable a timely response, even in the presence of 
ex-ante control. Existing transparency mechanisms, although combined, are not 
satisfactory. We therefore call for an enhancement of the transparency framework, 
both in its national and European dimensions.
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1. Introduction
 e issue of long-term import contracts (henceforth “LTCs”) 
with extra-EU gas suppliers has been at the forefront of the EU 
energy policy debate for a considerable period of time. Back in 
2003, the second liberalisation Directive had already acknowl-
edged their necessity to ensure the security of gas supply in 
the EU, as long as they were compatible with the objectives of 
the Directive and with the rules of the Treaty.4 At that time, 
LTCs were largely perceived as a competition problem, even 
though the preparatory documents leading to the Directive 
already provided evidence that EU institutions were divided 
on the impact of these contracts on security of gas supply. In 
a series of cases against Gazprom and Sonatrach in the early 
2000s, DG Comp only partly tackled the problem through EU 
competition law by focusing on unlawful territorial restrictions 
and pro t sharing mechanisms. In 2007, the DG Comp sector 
inquiry emphasised the potential anticompetitive e ects of 
LTCs, particularly regarding access to upstream supply mar-
kets, market liquidity and customer foreclosure.  e ongoing 
competition probe against Gazprom for the alleged abuse of 
dominance on Central and Eastern European gas supply mar-
kets shows that competition issues remain a serious source of 
concern to this day.
 e successive Ukraine-Russia transit crises provided concrete 
evidence that LTCs may create an unwarranted level of depend-
ency on a single supplier and thus endanger security of gas 
supply in some of the most vulnerable EU Member States. In 
this context, LTCs are always caught between law and politics. 
Externally, impinging on LTCs quickly heightens geopolitical 
tensions, in particular with Russia. Internally, Member States 
have always been reluctant to see the EU intervene in their 
external relations with foreign gas suppliers. Some progress 
has been made with the Council Decision of October 2012 
establishing an information exchange mechanism for intergov-
ernmental agreements (henceforth “IGAs”) between Member 
States and third countries in the  eld of energy. However, a lot 
remains to be done in this  eld, as demonstrated by the public 
consultation launched by the Commission in July 2015. 
 e issue of the suitability of the existing EU regulatory frame-
work for LTCs resurfaced recently in the Commission sta 
working document of 16 October 2014 (SWD(2014) 325  nal) 
on the implementation of the Regulation 994/2010 on secu-
rity of gas supply (herea er the “Gas SoS Regulation”). In this 
paper, the Commission argued that the lack of transparency on 
these contracts was a source of concern for vulnerable Member 
States without supply diversi cation and gas hubs, and called 
for a strengthened transparency framework.  e issue was 
raised again in the Council conclusions of 19 and 20 March 
4.  is position was reiterated in the third liberalisation Directive.
2015.  e Council recalled that both IGAs and commercial 
contracts should be plainly in line with EU law, in particular 
with the SoS legislation, though safeguards for business secrets 
should be ensured.
In the context of the current revamping of the Gas SoS Regula-
tion, this short note investigates ways to strengthen the existing 
EU regulatory framework for LTCs with foreign gas suppliers. 
We focus exclusively on commercial contracts.
2. LTCs and the Internal Market: 
Impact on SoS and Competition – 
Understanding the Issue
Despite the emergence of a competitive and integrated internal 
gas market in some parts of the EU, LTCs are far from becoming 
a residual instrument in the gas business. Indeed, “[…] new 
long-term contracts are still being signed, although their duration 
(typically around 10-15 years) is lower than the average dura-
tion of legacy contracts (20-25 years)”5. In addition, the trend 
towards shorter contracts only concerns the new contracts, 
whereas there are no signs of downward modi cations to the 
contract duration in the process of renegotiation a ecting 
existing LTCs. Besides, expired LTCs haven’t been renewed 
only in a few exceptional cases.6
LTCs are based on complex long-term arrangements negoti-
ated on a bilateral basis, sometimes at the inter-state level. 
Such contracts fall outside the scope of organised markets and 
hence make it di  cult for regulators to draw a clear picture 
of overall gas trade. Firstly, the general framework of a LTC 
regularly lacks information or displays it in a non-typical way: 
not surprisingly, in the new REMIT Regulation, LTCs belong 
to the category of “non-standardised contracts”. Secondly, the 
underlying deal may envisage di erent prices for the di erent 
time periods of delivery within the overall delivery time-range, 
based on pre-agreed indices, the nature of which tend to be 
complex and highly contract-speci c.  erefore, it is o en not 
possible to identify precise quantities or prices at the time of 
execution/delivery.  irdly, the quantities to be delivered gen-
erally have a high degree of optionality: contrary to “standard 
contracts” where clear and precise rules tend to guarantee cer-
tainty of delivery, the amount of gas eventually delivered may 
be uncertain and subject to the discretion of one of the two 
contracting parties.
In order to have a complete and accurate overview of the Euro-
pean gas market, one cannot disregard the impact of LTCs on 
cross-border  ows and the availability of capacity at the dif-
5. “Long-term gas contracts in Europe”, CIEP 2014
6. See  ndings of the Commission in its sta  working document of 16 Oc-
tober 2014, pages 18 and 19.
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ferent points of delivery.  is is true not only for monitoring 
security of supply, but also for e  cient competition and for the 
e ective identi cation of potential market abuses.7 As ACER 
rightly pointed out; “Reporting of records of transactions in non-
standardised contracts is crucial to have a complete picture of the 
trading activities of market participants. Market abuse practices 
like ramping or cross-market manipulation could not or only 
hardly be detected without information on non-standardised 
contracts. For instance, a market participant being a seller in a 
long-term contract with price components depending on develop-
ments of spot market prices could in uence the spot market prices 
by buying at arti cial high prices to bene t from these higher 
prices as a seller in the long-term contract(s). If no information 
were available on the long-term contracts, the activity on the spot 
markets alone would not necessarily be su  cient to identify sus-
picious instances. Only with the knowledge about the long-term 
contracts the picture is complete.”8
 e presence of LTCs within the EU internal gas market greatly 
a ects the competition dimension, particularly if we take a 
national perspective and analyse the considerable relevance 
of LTCs in certain Member States, where the national gas 
market is not yet “mature” or fully developed. If we take into 
account market variables like hub liquidity, number of market 
players, concentration, information transparency and so on, 
we realise the extent to which LTCs imply a di erent meaning 
for Western-European fully liquid markets or for some Eastern 
European markets (particularly in the so-called “transit coun-
tries”), which are substantially or entirely dependent on one 
external supplier. In a nutshell, the impact of LTCs on secu-
rity of gas supply and competition is markedly di erent in 
hub-based Western markets and isolated Eastern markets once 
these LTCs are signed.
3.  e Shortcomings of the Existing EU 
Regulatory Framework: the Limits of a 
‘Reactive’ Approach
 e existing EU regulatory framework for LTCs with foreign gas 
suppliers pursues two objectives: reacting to emergency supply 
crisis and tackling market abuse. It operates through three 
complementary but partly overlapping instruments: an ex-ante 
transparency mechanism structured by the Gas SoS Regulation, 
an ex-post EU competition enforcement by the Commission 
7. Additionally, the availability of certain gas capacities linked to LTCs, at 
present, could be detected through a speci c legal instrument.  is is 
the case, for example of the so-called “hanging capacities” which were 
originally linked to LTCs and terminated at a second stage.
8. ACER Recommendations on REMIT Records of Transactions, 23 Octo-
ber 2012.
and a sort of hybrid ex-post mechanism combining transpar-
ency and enforcement by national regulators through REMIT.9 
3.1  e limits of the Gas SoS Regulation transparency 
mechanism
Under Art 13(6)(b) of the Gas SoS Regulation, gas compa-
nies must notify the ‘competent authority’ (hence not neces-
sarily the national regulator) of all LTCs signed for more than 
one year. However, the contracts themselves do not have to be 
reported.  e transparency requirements only concern certain 
characteristics: contract length, forecast of total annual volume 
and average volume per month, delivery points and forecasted 
daily maximum volume in case of alert or emergency.10
 e national emergency plans covered by Art (10)(1)(k) of 
the Gas SoS Regulation must detail the reporting obligations 
imposed on natural gas undertakings at alert and emergency 
levels. National emergency plans also establish a list of prede-
 ned actions to make gas available in the event of an emergency, 
including commercial agreements between the parties involved 
in such actions and the compensation mechanisms for natural 
gas undertakings where appropriate, taking due account of the 
con dentiality of sensitive data. Such actions may involve cross-
border agreements between Member States and/or natural gas 
companies, under Art (10)(1)(i) of the Regulation.
 e Commission has dra ed a template that the competent 
authorities must  ll-in.  e competent authorities must then 
notify the Commission of these data under an aggregate form. 
On a regular basis, information must be updated. Of course, 
the Commission and the competent authority have a duty to 
ensure con dentiality. According to the Commission’s sta 
working document of 16 October 2014, only 10 Member States 
had provided information using the template and  ve (mostly 
Eastern and Baltic) Member States provided non-aggregated 
data. 
9.  e ex-ante / ex-post dichotomy refers here to the period either before, or 
a er, a particular contract is signed or a particular trade takes place.
10. Art 10(3) of the Gas SoS Regulation foresees 3 steps:
“(a) early warning level (early warning): when there is concrete, serious and 
reliable information that an event may occur which is likely to result in 
the signi cant deterioration of the supply situation and is likely to lead 
to the alert or the emergency level being triggered; the early warning 
level may be activated by an early warning mechanism;
(b) alert level (alert): when a supply disruption or exceptionally high gas de-
mand occurs which results in the signi cant deterioration of the supply 
situation, but the market is still able to manage that disruption or de-
mand without the need to resort to non-market measures;
(c) emergency level (emergency): in the event of exceptionally high gas de-
mand, a signi cant supply disruption or other signi cant deterioration 
of the supply situation, and in the event that all relevant market meas-
ures have been implemented, but the supply of gas is insu  cient to meet 
the remaining gas demand, so that non-market measures have to be ad-
ditionally introduced with a view, in particular, to safeguarding the sup-
plies of gas to protected customers according to Article 8.”
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It follows from the above that the Gas SoS Regulation transpar-
ency mechanism su ers from severe shortcomings:
1. “in case of alert or emergency only”: some key infor-
mation is either not communicated to the competent 
authority (in particular, the contracts themselves) or is 
communicated at a very late stage (daily max. volumes 
foreseen). 
2. the ‘competent authority’ problem: the competent 
authority (e.g., a ministry) does not necessarily have the 
same sanction powers as those ensured by the third lib-
eralisation package for regulators.  ey might not have 
either the same level of understanding or even information 
on market functioning. 
3. the ‘data aggregation’ problem: the Commission is largely 
kept in the dark due to data aggregation.  is might have 
an impact on the Commission assessment of national 
preventive and emergency plans and its ability to declare 
emergency situations at the EU and regional levels, even 
though the Commission can declare the existence of such 
a situation only when two competent authorities have 
asked for it. In addition, the Regulation does not specify 
any time frame for information updates.
4. the ‘lack of teeth’ problem: the mechanism does not 
specify clear sanction powers and to which entity such 
powers should be allocated when relevant data is not pro-
vided by gas companies.
5. the ‘one size  ts all’ problem: the mechanism does not 
introduce di erentiation in terms of transparency require-
ments according to the market situation (e.g. hub-based 
Western markets and isolated Eastern markets), creating 
both unnecessary regulatory costs and red tape.
6. the ‘Europeanisation’ problem: the mechanism does 
not allow for an information exchange mechanism across 
neighbouring Member States, whereas, as per Art 9 of the 
Gas SoS Regulation, competent authorities should do their 
national risk assessment with regards to real (projected) 
 ows, including cross-border  ows.  e same problem 
occurs when competent authorities decide to build 
regional preventive plans (Art 4(3)).
3.2  e limits of EU competition enforcement
Up until now, EU competition law has been the main regula-
tory device used to address the negative e ects of LTCs with 
foreign gas suppliers.  e ongoing battle between the Commis-
sion and Gazprom shows that this tool remains reliable, even 
in a highly politicised context. Even though it can be used to 
gain leverage and obtain deterrence, it also su ers from serious 
shortcomings.
First, competition enforcement tends to be slow. It can take 
years to reach a decision and possibly a Court judgment. In 
addition, compliance with decisions and judgments cannot 
be taken for granted. Competition enforcement is thus not a 
suitable tool to address security of supply issues. Second, dam-
ages cannot always be quanti ed with accuracy, or at all, in the 
context of follow-on damage suits. Redress and compensation 
through private enforcement of competition law is therefore 
not reliable, in particular for household customers.  ird, the 
ability of competition enforcers to suitably integrate in the 
analysis foreseeable issues pertinent to security of gas supply 
is yet to be proven. 
3.3  e limits of the REMIT mechanism
According to Art 7(1) of REMIT, ACER shall collect the data 
for assessing and monitoring wholesale energy markets as pro-
vided for in Art 8 of REMIT.
 e Commission’s implementing acts set the deadline for 
eligible market participants to start reporting on wholesale 
energy contracts (over-the-counter standard and non-standard 
supply contracts, transportation contracts) and on the report-
able fundamental data from Transmission, LNG and Storage 
System Operators. Non-OMP contracts, i.e. contracts that are 
not traded via brokers or on exchange platforms, must there-
fore be reported only as of 7 April 2016. LTCs with foreign gas 
suppliers fall into this category. Reporting takes place in case of 
execution, modi cation or early termination of a transaction.11 
O en, LTCs (with optionality) have daily executions: this 
means that the commodity purchased under a LTC is delivered 
daily at an entry point and then re-traded (either bilaterally or 
via exchange).  e long-term (framework) contract will then 
be reported as a non-standard contract (describing optionality 
and complex pricing formulas). Individual daily executions 
will also be reported, but as standard contracts because they 
will have an outright price and volume.
 e limits of this way of reporting ex-post are obvious: while LTCs 
(framework) are reported in general terms and as non-standard 
contracts, the information (volumes, prices, etc.) on the daily 
deliveries or deals which are subsequent to the same framework 
contract are reported as standard contracts.  is means that the 
two categories of data cannot be matched as belonging to the 
same agreement. As such, information collected under REMIT 
11. According to the ACER Manual of Procedures on transaction and fun-
damental data reporting of 18 June 2015, non-standard supply contracts 
need to be reported following requirements of Table 2 of the Annex of 
the implementing acts: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/
HTML/?uri=OJ:JOL_2014_363_R_0009&from=EN
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only provides a partial overview of the underlying agreement of 
a transaction.
3.4 From a Reactive to a Proactive Approach
In essence, the EU regulatory framework for LTCs with foreign 
gas suppliers follows a ‘reactive’ approach, in the sense that it 
principally aims to react once a gas supply crisis or a market 
abuse has already occurred or is in the making. We can see 
that regulatory powers concerning security of supply are still 
(unsurprisingly) largely in the hands of national governments. 
In some countries, this re ects the national division of consti-
tutional responsibilities on security of supply.
EU competition law and REMIT work ex-post and mainly, in 
the end, on hoped-for deterrence e ects.  ey are not under-
pinned by a security of supply rationale and are thus unable 
to address the concerns of the most vulnerable Member States 
on this matter. It would be accurate to say that the Gas SoS 
transparency mechanism is a forward-looking instrument. 
However, it only reaches its real e ect in the so-called alert and 
emergency stages. Furthermore, it is fundamentally limited by 
severe design  aws.  is necessitates turning to a more ‘proac-
tive’ approach.
In our view, a more proactive EU regulatory framework for 
LTCs with foreign gas suppliers should:
• ensure e ective transparency, i.e. that the best placed 
public authority obtains, at the right moment, the most 
accurate picture of all the relevant gas  ows in order to be 
able to act on time;
• make sure that both security of supply and competition 
concerns are taken into account concurrently;
•  ne-tune the role of the di erent players (national regula-
tors, competent authorities, Commission, ACER);
• re ne the interaction of the available regulatory instru-
ments;
• ensure that the EU and regional interests are well 
accounted for;
• ensure proportionality: regulatory costs and red tape 
should be kept to a minimum to account for the fact that 
hub-based Western markets and isolated Eastern markets 
are in di erent situations.
In this context, it is tempting to consider the introduction of 
a mechanism allowing for control of LTCs ex-ante, i.e. before 
they are signed. However, appealing as they may be, ex-ante 
control mechanisms are generally characterised by worryingly 
high regulatory costs and red tape. Once LTCs are signed, 
transparency is paramount to allow action on time, even in 
the presence of ex-ante control. Yet, existing transparency 
mechanisms (Gas SoS Regulation transparency mechanism 
and REMIT reporting obligations), appear to be unsatisfac-
tory. We therefore call for an enhancement of the transparency 
framework, which might also be more politically acceptable. 
4. Ex-Ante Control Mechanism: Do Not  
 Use a Hatchet to Remove a Fly
A  rst solution (the competition law route) would be to 
strengthen the EU competition enforcement framework by 
introducing an ex-ante element in terms of assessment. Fol-
lowing the rationale of the former Regulation 17, pre-noti -
cation of LTCs to the Commission for an ex-ante compliance 
check with EU competition rules could be introduced. At the 
same time, the security of gas supply concerns might not be well 
accounted for, and the pre-noti cation may impose too high 
of an administrative burden on the Commission (DG Comp). 
 ese problems could partially be alleviated through strength-
ened internal cooperation between DG Comp and DG Energy. 
 e Commission could also enact so  law guidelines on accept-
able contract forms in order to provide guidance to operators. 
However, the non-binding character of such guidelines would 
largely undermine their concrete outcomes. A third option 
could be to introduce a safe harbour in the context of a block 
exemption regulation, i.e. to de ne criteria ex-ante in a piece of 
the EU legislation, the ful lment of which would result in auto-
matic compliance with the competition rules without the need 
for companies to notify contracts beforehand.  is approach 
would have merit, as it would provide legal certainty to opera-
tors and limit the administrative burden on the Commission. 
It would, however, lack  exibility as no assessment of concrete 
situations would be carried out, as in the case of so  law guide-
lines. In addition, it remains di  cult (but certainly not impos-
sible) to de ne criteria that would be relevant for the whole 
Union due to the diversity of real-world gas market settings. 
A second solution (the Euratom route) would be to imple-
ment a purchasing scheme inspired by the Euratom Treaty, 
which requires that the Euratom Supply Agency be involved 
in procurement and supply balance monitoring. ACER would 
be playing the role of the Euratom Supply Agency, in our case. 
Lighter and voluntary versions of such mechanisms are cur-
rently being discussed for emergency situations, following the 
usual ‘reactive’ approach described above.  e idea of struc-
turing a common buying scheme (aimed at regaining leverage 
on foreign gas suppliers) has been discussed for a long time but 
has lost strength recently with the development of more com-
petitive and integrated markets in Western Europe.  is trend 
is clear in the recent communication of the Commission on the 
Energy Union. On the positive side, such a scheme would allow 
for an assessment of each speci c situation and wider EU/
regional interests would be better taken into account. On the 
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negative side, it would create high regulatory costs for ACER, 
a need to grant ACER access to the data gathered under the 
Gas SoS transparency mechanism and a host of fairly compli-
cated EU law issues. Even more problematic, it would dramati-
cally increase red tape for gas companies. Overall, this second 
solution, though interesting in theory, appears to overkill the 
problem at hand.
A third and more promising solution (the national regulators 
route) would be to introduce a lighter approval mechanism at 
the national level, such as the one foreseen for merchant trans-
mission investments. In short, Art 36 of the third gas Direc-
tive organises a mechanism where national regulators can 
grant derogations from certain provisions of the Directive, in 
particular third-party access, to private investors in gas infra-
structure, provided that certain criteria are met. In particular, 
such pro t-motivated investment should strengthen both com-
petition and security of gas supply.  e  rst advantage in our 
case is to place national regulators at the centre of the game. 
 rough their myriad interactions with gas operators and the 
information they can obtain under REMIT, they have a unique 
understanding of their own market.  ey are therefore the 
best placed to assess simultaneously both the security of gas 
supply and competition12 issues. It is worth recalling that in its 
 rst reading of the second gas Directive, the European Parlia-
ment had already recommended that regulatory authorities be 
entrusted with the ability to call LTCs into question. Regula-
tors are also used to cooperate with each other in di erent fora. 
12. It is worth mentioning that they have o en been involved in competition 
proceedings.
As national regulators would only be responsible for their own 
markets, regulatory costs would be manageable. 
 e two main challenges with the national regulators route are 
(i) to avoid an unnecessary burden on  rms and (ii) make sure 
that regional and EU interests are taken into account.
(i) Given the di erences between hub-based Western mar-
kets and isolated Eastern markets, the problem of red tape 
should be taken seriously. A way to solve the issue would 
be to de ne ex-ante contracts, which have to be noti ed. 
It should be done at EU level. A simple criterion, which 
would encompass both the security of supply and compe-
tition issues, would be to de ne a market share threshold. 
Indeed, security of supply and most competition issues 
emerge when too high a part of the demand is serviced by 
a single contract or supplier.  is criterion has the advan-
tage of being easy to administer.
(ii) In order to make sure that regional and EU interests are 
well accounted for, an obligation modelled on Art 36(8) 
and (9) of the Gas Directive to request an opinion from 
ACER or the Commission could be introduced. ACER or 
the Commission could then require the national regulator 
to amend or withdraw its decision.  
Options
Ability to tackle 
both SoS and 
competition 
issues
Regulatory costs Red tape
EU/Regional 
interests Tailor decisions
 e competition 
law route
Ex-ante 
noti cation
- --- --- ++ ++
So  law 
guidelines
-- +++ ++ + ---
Block 
exemption 
regulation
-- ++ ++ + ---
 e Euratom route +++ --- --- +++ ++
 e national regulators route +++ - -- ++ +++
Table 1: Preliminary comparative assessment 
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5. Towards a Strengthened Transparency 
 Framework:  e Low Cost – High 
 Reward Route
A strengthened transparency framework is all the more impor-
tant if an ex-ante control mechanism does not exist. Both solu-
tions should not be seen as substitutes but as complements. 
Indeed, once LTCs are signed, supply crises and market abuses 
can always occur.
We believe that amending the REMIT reporting regime is not 
the right course of action in this context, even if it provides 
useful (repeat) information on the market conditions (in par-
ticular, standard forward contracts) in a speci c trading zone. 
 e Gas SoS Regulation transparency mechanism is thus the 
best candidate for improvement. 
We propose to proceed according to the following guiding 
principles:
• Data reporting to the Commission should be improved, in 
particular through data disaggregation, even though it can 
be presumed that vulnerable Member States might be more 
likely to voluntarily provide data in such a format. A binding 
reporting to the Commission on the daily maximum vol-
umes at each delivery point, at least as soon as we enter the 
emergency stages, is important.
•  e competent authority should be given the power to 
request data on daily forecasted volumes when a certain 
benchmark (e.g. a certain percentage of market demand 
is tied under a single contract or with a single supplier) is 
reached, without waiting to enter the alert or emergency 
‘zone’. EU legislation could require that national emergency 
plans contain strengthened reporting obligations in this 
regard.
•  e competent authority should be able to jointly analyse 
REMIT data and data reported under the Gas SoS Regu-
lation transparency mechanism. Provisions concerning 
(binding) cooperation between the national regulator and 
the competent authority should be introduced.
• A binding time frame for reporting by gas companies to the 
competent authority should be de ned.
• EU legislation should require Member States to make sure 
that appropriate sanction measures are put in place (and 
thus powers suitably allocated) when relevant data is not 
provided. 
•  e competent authority should be given the power to 
request contracts themselves during the alert and emer-
gency stages, but these contracts should not be made public 
to avoid breach of business secrets. 
•  e one-year period should not be amended. Contracts 
shorter than one-year cover a fairly marginal part of demand 
in Eastern markets, and Western markets are liquid enough 
so that such contracts are not crucial.
• Respecting business secrets and con dentiality issues is 
paramount. In this context, publishing even aggregated con-
tract data gathered through the di erent reporting mecha-
nisms is not a priority, even though it can provide a useful 
benchmark for the ongoing contracts negotiations. 
• Limiting red tape and regulatory costs is crucial.
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